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I. INTRODUCTION
Since thirty percent of U.S. agricultural production is ex-
ported, the prosperity of American farmers depends on interna-
tional trade.' Exports of agricultural commodities and
* Partner, Ablondi, Foster, Sobin & Davidow, p.c. Washington, D.C. Mr.
McNiel served as senior counsel responsible for international trade matters at
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1988-1997, and actively participated in the
negotiation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the NAFTA agriculture
chapter.
1. See U.S. Efforts to Reduce Barriers to Trade in Agriculture: Hearings
before the Subcomm. On Trade of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 105'
Cong., 2 nd Sess. (Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Robert F. Smith, Chairman of
the House Committee on Agriculture).
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processed products, valued at nearly $60 billion, support nearly
one million U.S. jobs and leave American farmers nearly twice
as reliant on foreign trade as the U.S. economy as a whole.2 The
agriculture sector has consistently been the largest positive con-
tributor to the U.S. balance of trade. 3
International trade will be even more important in the fu-
ture.4 The "Freedom to Farm" Act of 19965 terminated the fed-
eral government's domestic subsidy payments that had been
tied to farm production.6 The "golden parachute" of decoupled
transition payments has been declining and will leave almost no
federal transfer of funds to farmers after the year 2002. 7 The
1996 farm bill also terminated acreage reduction programs. As
a result, 15 million set aside acres have been returned to produc-
tion, further increasing agricultural surpluses.8 For several
years farm productivity has been increasing at a rate of 3 to 4
percent annually, and advances in biotechnology promise even
greater surpluses in the future.9 Clearly, the growing market
for the products of American farmers are overseas, where mil-
lions of new middle class consumers each year are adding to the
world's demand for food and fiber, far above the small increase
in domestic demand resulting from nearly zero population
growth in the United States.10
Despite or perhaps because of the tremendous productivity
of American farms, many farmers once again have been facing a
financial crisis in the past two years as the prices of hogs, wheat,
2. See Testimony of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry,
May 7, 1998 [hereinafter Testimony of Ambassador Barshefsky].
3. See id.
4. See Stewart Truelsen, Farm Exports: The Driving Force for U.S. Agri-
culture, American Farm Bureau Focus on Agriculture (Mar. 16, 1998).
5. See the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996).
6. For a colorful discussion of prior commodity programs, see P.J.
O'RoURKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES 142-153 (1991).
7. See Economic Research Service, Provisions of the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (Commercial Agriculture Division, Agri-
culture Information Bulletin No. 729, Frederick J. Nelson and Lyle P. Schertz,
eds.) <http://www.econ.ag.gov/epubs/pdf/aib729/index.htm>. See also Scott Kil-
man, Weaning Farmers: Crop Deregulation Is Put to the Test in New Rural Cri-
sis, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1998, at Al.
8. See Dennis T. Avery, U.S. Farmers Struggle with Stagnant Domestic
Market: Why Fast Track Trade Authority Matters, 23 GLOBAL FOOD QUARTERLY
1 (1998).
9. See id; see also Eldon Ball & Richard Nehring, Productivity: Agricul-
ture's Engine of Growth, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, May 1996, at 25-28.
10. See Testimony by Ambassador Barshefsky, supra note 2.
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corn, soybeans and other farm commodities collapsed to levels
lower than in the past decade. 1 Some blame the new farm bill
for eliminating most agricultural price supports. 12 Some point to
the economic recession that started in Japan and spread to
much of the rest of Asia and other regions of the world, resulting
in sharp reductions of U.S. agricultural commodity exports and
depressed domestic and world prices. 13 Almost all agree that
there is an urgent need to expand exports by reducing foreign
barriers to imports of U.S. agricultural products. 14
The principal role of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 15 since 1947 has been to facilitate the expansion of world
trade by sponsoring multilateral trade negotiations for progres-
11. See 145 CONG. REC. S5659-5662 (online ed. May 20, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Dorgan); see also Lane Kugler, Farmers Hit the Skids, J. Com., June 11,
1998 at 4a; ECON. RES. SERV., World Agricultural Supply and Demand Esti-
mates (May 12, 1999) <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/waobr/wasde-
bb/1999/wasde350.pdf>. and historical data maintained by the National Agri-
cultural Statistics Service; ROBERT N. COLLENDER, Agricultural Boom & Bust:
Will History Repeat in the 1990's?, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, April 1999, at 22.
12. See 145 CONG. REC. S4215-4216 (online ed. Apr. 27, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Dorgan); see also C. David Kelly, The High Cost of Freedom? AM. FARM
BUREAU Focus ON AGRIC., Feb. 1, 1999; See also Scott Kilman, Weaning Farm-
ers: Crop Deregulation Is Put to the Test in New Rural Crisis, WALL ST. J., Nov.
9, 1998, at Al. Cf John R. Block, Hands Off the Farm Law, J. Com., July 29,
1998, at 7a.
13. See Chairman Alan Greenspan, The Farm Economy, Address at the
Annual Convention of the Independent Bankers Association of America (Mar.
16, 1999) (transcript available at Colorado State University Library); EcoN.
RES. SERV., GLOBAL AGRIC. TRADE (Mar. 8, 1999) <http://www.econ.ag.gov/brief-
ing/baseline/trade.htm>; see also Dennis T. Avery, Farm Policies Play a Role in
Global Economic Turmoil (1999) <httpJ/www.hudson.orgaverydoc8.htm>, and
Dennis T. Avery, Asian Tigers Still Not Feeding on US Farm Imports, BRIDGE
NEWS FORUM, May 28, 1999. Data published by the WTO showed declines in
exports of agricultural products from North America to Asia of 4% in 1996 and
10% in 1997.
14. See U.S. Efforts to Reduce Barriers to Trade in Agriculture: Hearings
before the Subcomm. On Trade of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 105'
Cong., 2 nd Sess. (Feb. 12, 1998)(statements of Congressman Robert F. Smith,
Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, Ambassador Peter L. Scher,
Special Trade Negotiator for Agriculture, Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, August Schumacher Jr., Under Secretary of Agriculture, Dean R.
Kleckner, President, American Farm Bureau Federation, Nicholas D. Giordano,
Assistant Vice President for Trade, National Pork Producers Council, Leonard
W. Condon, Vice President for Trade, American Meat Institute, and David
Moore, President, Western Growers Association); see also Dennis T. Avery, Aid
to Farmers a Poor Substitute for Farm Trade (1999) <http://www.hudson.org]
averydoc9.htm>.
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT. The original GATT was superceded by the
GATT 1994. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
MzivN. J GLOBAL TRADE
sively reducing tariffs and by restraining or eliminating other
governmental trade-distorting practices. 16 However, the rules
of the GATT have always contained exceptions that permitted
governments to pursue protectionist and mercantilist policies in
the agricultural sector, through import restrictions and domestic
and export subsidies.17 The disparate treatment of agriculture
gave rise to the widespread use of measures that were not per-
mitted or were highly questionable under GATT rules.' 8 The
European Union's Common Agricultural Policy has often been
cited as the most egregious example of agricultural protection-
ism. 19 U.S. agricultural policies and the GATT waiver 20 for U.S.
quotas and fees on imports of agricultural products have also
been cited as a factor in fostering noncompliance with GATT
commitments. 2'
Attempts had been made in previous rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations to bring agricultural trade practices under
stricter disciplines. 22 These attempts were mostly jettisoned at
the end of the negotiations because the trade-distorting policies
and their constituencies were too entrenched.23 Finally, during
the Uruguay Round, all members of the newly-established
WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21-38 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 19941.
16. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 17-21 (1970).
17. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 317-
321, 392-396 (1969); JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A
HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 104-105 (1995).
18. See DALE E. HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT: REWRITING THE
RULES, Policy Analyses in Intl Economics 1-4, 103-113 (1987); see also JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 57 (1998).
19. See Kenneth W. Dam, The European Common Market in Agriculture,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (1967). Professor Dam wrote that "the variable levy is to
protection what the wheel was to transportation. Id .at 217; see also BERNARD
HOEKMAN & MICHEL KosTEcu, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRAD-
ING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 197 (1995).
20. See Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection With Import
Restrictions Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Ad-
justment Act (of 1933), As Amended, GATT B.I.S.D (3d Supp.) 32 (1955).
21. See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 318-320, 737-738.
22. See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 225, 729, 737-739; JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 313-314 (2d ed. 1998); see also FRANKLIN R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 192 (4' ed. 1978); GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 18-36 (1979); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOR. AGRIC.
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World Trade Organization 24 agreed upon disciplines on agricul-
tural policies relating to domestic support, market access, export
competition and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.2 5
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture26 has re-
sulted in reforms of agricultural policies in many countries
around the world and has been credited with expanding the
world trade of agricultural commodities and products. 27 None-
theless, the reforms were modest and left substantial impedi-
ments and distortions in the world market. 28 The Agreement
contained a continuation clause intended to force the parties to
negotiate further reforms. 29 The WTO Ministerial Conference
in Singapore commenced an Analysis and Information Exchange
process to prepare for the next round of multilateral negotia-
tions on agriculture. 30 Those negotiations were scheduled to be-
gin in Seattle by the end of 1999 with the Ministerial Conference
which was expected to commence the next round of multilateral
trade negotiations. 3 1
If what is past is prologue,3 2 the mosaic of existing provi-
sions of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, as
well as other agreements administered by the WTO, will largely
determine the shape of the new negotiations on further reforms
of agricultural policies. The Seattle Round Agricultural Corn-
24. See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING T=E WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY
OF THE URUGUAY RouND (1995) for a thorough discussion of the Uruguay Round
and the creation of the WTO.
25. See Kevin J. Brosch, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in
THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY RoUND AGREEMENTS ACT 876-877 (H.
Applebaum and L. Schlitt eds. 1995).
26. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 15, Annex 1A, 39-68 [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
27. See ECON. RES. SERV., AGRiCULTURE IN THE WTO 3 (1998).
28. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (hereinafter FAO), IMPACT OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND ON AGRICULTURE (1994); see also FAO, "The UN Food and Agricul-
ture Organization to Begin New Assessment of the Impact of the Uruguay
Round on Agricultural Markets," Press Release 99/1, which notes a FAO study
that found "little evidence of the impact of the Uruguay Round on the volume of
trade and level of prices on the world market in a majority of cases."
29. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 20.
30. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para. 19
(Dec. 13, 1996); WTO Committee on Agriculture: General Council Overview of
WTO Activities (1998), Report by the Chairman, WTO/G/1/276 (Nov. 20, 1998).
31. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 20; Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.,
Solicitation of Public Comment Regarding U.S. Preparations for the World
Trade Organization's Ministerial Meeting, Fourth Quarter 1999, 63 Fed. Reg.
44500 (August 19, 1998); Office of the United States Trade Representative,
"1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial to be Held in Seattle," Press Re-
lease 99-09 (January 25, 1999).
32. See WiLIAM SHAKEsPEAE, THE TEMPEST, Part II, act i, line 251.
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mittee, comprised of a wide range of agricultural companies and
associations, has endorsed adoption of the Uruguay Round
framework, 33 and the U.S. Trade Representative has indicated
that the future negotiations will build on the Uruguay Round
agreements, as explained by Ambassador Peter Scher in this
symposium. 3 4 As a prelude to the impending agricultural talks
in Geneva, this article will discuss the relevant provisions of the
GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture and make predic-
tions on the course of the upcoming negotiations.
II. GATT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
A. DOMESTIC SUPPORT
The frequently cited problems of farm price supports in-
clude high prices for consumers, onerous restrictions and cen-
tralized control of farmers' activities, spreading governmental
bureaucracy, and the hindrance of foreign policy objectives such
as liberalized trade.35 The GATT, however, only provides that
WTO members utilizing any trade-distorting subsidy36 notify
the GATT Parties/WTO. 37 The only limitation on trade-dis-
torting domestic subsidies is an obligation of the Member pro-
viding the subsidies to consult, on request, with other members
on "the possibility of limiting the subsidization."38 The GATT
also exempts the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic
producers and subsidies effected through governmental
purchases of domestic products from the normal obligation to
provide non-discriminatory or "national" treatment to imported
products 39 and provides special treatment of domestic subsidies
on agricultural products with respect to anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duties.40 However, GATT panels have found that do-
33. See Agriculture Coalition Sets Priorities for WTO, Sidesteps Radical
Reform, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21, 1999.
34. See Testimony of Ambassador Barshefsky, supra note 2.
35. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 182 (1962).
36. A trade-distorting domestic subsidy is a subsidy, including any form of
income or price support, which operates, directly or indirectly, to increase ex-
ports or to reduce imports of any product.
37. The notification must be in writing and must describe the extent and
nature of the subsidization, the estimated effects of the subsidization on prod-
ucts imported into or exported from its territory, and the circumstances making
the subsidization necessary.
38. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVI:I.
39. See GATT, supra note 15, art. III:8(b).
40. See GATT, supra note 15, art. VI:7, which provides: "A system for the
stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to domestic producers of a
[Vol. 9:41
2000] FURTHERING REFORMS OF AGRICULTURAL POLiCiES 47
mestic subsidies on agricultural commodities can nullify or
impair tariff concessions. 41 Other than these relatively modest
disciplines prior to the Uruguay Round, domestic support for ag-
ricultural commodities, as a practical matter, was not subject to
significant international disciplines under the provisions of the
GATT 1947.42 During the period 1986 to 1990, the cost of do-
mestic support both to taxpayers and consumers averaged $92
billion per year in the EC, $35 billion in Japan, and $24 billion
in the United States. 43
B. MARKET AcCESS
Prior to the Uruguay Round, market access for agricultural
commodities and processed food products was often subject to
unbound tariffs and a variety of protectionist non-tariff barriers
designed to limit imports and maintain high domestic prices."4
During previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, few
tariff concessions or bindings (under which a WTO member can-
not impose any higher rate of duty than the bound rate on prod-
ucts originating in other WTO members)45 have been made for
imports of agricultural products due to negotiations on a re-
primary commodity, independently of the movements of export prices, which
results at times in the sale of the commodity for export at a price lower than the
comparable price charged for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic mar-
ket, shall be presumed not to result in material injury within the meaning of
paragraph 6 if it is determined by consultation among the contracting parties
substantially interested in the commodity concerned that: (a) the system has
also resulted in the sale of the commodity for export at a price higher than the
comparable price charged for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic mar-
ket, and (b) the system is so operated, either because of the effective regulation
of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports unduly or otherwise se-
riously prejudice the interests of other contracting parties.
41. See EEC - Payments and subsidies paid to processors and producers of
oilseeds and related animal-feed proteins, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86
(1992).
42. See Paul C. Rosenthal & Lynn E. Duffy, Reforming Global Trade in
Agriculture in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAME-
WORK FOR THE 21' CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 168 (1996).
43. See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KosTEcmi, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 197 (1995).
44. See Kevin J. Brosch, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in
THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT 876-877 (H.
Applebaum and L. Schlitt eds. 1995).
45. See GATT, supra note 15, art. II:l(b); see also DAM, supra note 16, at
30-31; JACKSON, supra note 17, at 201-217 (1969). WTO Members are prohibited
from imposing "fees and charges of whatever character" (other than import du-
ties, internal taxes, or countervailing or antidumping duties) on or in connec-
tion with importation unless they are user fees limited in amount to the
approximate cost of services rendered and do not represent an indirect protec-
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 9:41
quest/offer basis, even in the Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round
where formula cuts were made in tariffs on industrial prod-
ucts. 4 6 Before the Uruguay Round, only 58 percent of agricul-
tural tariffs were bound, as compared with 78 percent of
industrial tariffs, and agricultural tariffs averaged well over 50
percent ad valorem in developed countries compared with an av-
erage of 6 percent for industrial tariffs. 47
GATT tariff bindings can be modified or withdrawn 4
through renegotiations with any other member with whom the
concession was initially negotiated49 and any other member de-
termined to have a principal supplying interest in the conces-
sion.50 The negotiations must "endeavor to maintain a general
level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not
less favorable to trade than that provided for ... prior to such
negotiations."5 ' If agreement on compensation cannot be
reached with the members having negotiating rights, the appli-
cant is nevertheless free to modify its schedule. 52 In the event of
such unilateral action, the members with negotiating rights and
all members with substantial supplier interests are entitled, for
tion to domestic products or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes.
See GATT, art. VIII:1.
46. See DAm, supra note 16, at 70-71; GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 24 (April, 1979); FOR. AGRiC. SERV., REPORT ON
AGRICULTURAL CONCESSIONS IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 3
(1981).
47. See ECON. RES. SERV., AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO 6 (1998).
48. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XXVIII. Tariff bindings may be modified
or withdrawn during (1) "open Season" renegotiations, which apply to the with-
drawal or modification of concessions to take effect on the first day of each 3-
year period since January 1, 1958 (see Art. XXVIII:1); (2) "special circum-
stances" (or "out-of-season") renegotiations may be authorized by the Council
.at any time, in special circumstances" (see art. XXVIII:4); or (3) "reserved" re-
negotiations may occur, without prior authorization, if the member initiating
them had notified the Council during the previous 3-year period that it was
reserving the right to modify its Schedule for the duration of the following 3-
year period. (see art. XXVIII:5).
49. See id. Parties have "initial negotiating rights" or INRs if they re-
quested the relevant concession(s) in rounds of request/offer negotiations or if
they are deemed to have INRs due to having current principal supplier status
for purposes of linear concessions during the Uruguay Round.
50. See id. The applicant is also required to consult with any member de-
termined to have a "substantial interest" in the concession. It has been said
that "substantial interest is not capable of a precise definition" but is intended
to cover those contracting parties which have "a significant share" in the mar-
ket of the applicant. See art. XXVIII: 1 note 7. The Committee on Tariff Conces-
sions, in July 1985, noted that the "10 per cent share" rule had been generally
applied for the definition of "substantial supplier." GATT Doc. TAR/M/16 p.10.
51. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXVIII:2.
52. See id. art. XXVIII:3 and 4(d).
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the following 6 months, to retaliate by withdrawing substan-
tially equivalent concessions.53
The GATT generally prohibits quantitative restrictions on
imports and exports through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures.5 4 This ban comprehensively applies to all gov-
ernmental measures instituted or maintained that prohibit or
restrict imports, other than duties, taxes or other charges.5, A
major exception applies to quotas and other restrictions on im-
ports of agricultural products.5 6 This exception allowed import
restrictions on agricultural commodities and products that were
still in an early stage of processing to implement if necessary a
domestic supply control program. But important cases during
the Uruguay Round severely limited the value of the excep-
tion.57 Other import quotas were justified by waivers or other
derogations, including the waiver for U.S. quotas on agricultural
products which was upheld during the Uruguay Round.58
Finally, WTO members generally must accord nondiscrimi-
natory most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to imports from all
53. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XXVIII:3(a).
54. The ban on quantitative restrictions provides: "No prohibitions or re-
strictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party...." GATT, supra note 15, art. XI:A.
55. See Japan Trade in Semi-conductors, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at
115; EEC Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Security Depos-
its for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, GATT B.I.S.D. (25'" Supp.) at
98-100.
56. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XI:2(c)(i), which provides: "The provi-
sions of paragraph 1.. . shall not extend to the following: ... (c) Import restric-
tions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary
to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate: (i) to restrict the
quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced,
or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domes-
tic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted...." An
interpretive note defines the term "in any form" to cover "the same products
when in an early stage of processing and still perishable, which compete di-
rectly with the fresh product and if freely imported would tend to make the
restriction on the fresh product ineffective." GATT art. XI.
57. See Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Prod-
ucts,GATT B.I.S.D. (35 th Supp.) at 163 (1988); Canada - Import Restrictions on
Ice Cream and Yogurt, GATT B.I.S.D. (36'h Supp. 68) (1989).
58. See Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection With Import
Restrictions Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Ad-
justment Act (of 1933), As Amended, GATT B.I.S.D (3d Supp.) at 32 (1955);
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Sugar and Sugar-Containing Prod-
ucts applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote to the Schedule of
Tariff Concessions, GATT B.I.S.D. (37'h Supp.) at 228 (1990).
MNN. J GLOBAL TRADE
other WTO members. 59 Tariff preferences, or import duties at
rates lower than the MFN rates, are permitted under the Gener-
alized System of Preferences (GSP), a preferential tariff ar-
rangement intended to promote the export earnings and
economic development of less-developed countries by exempting
their exports from the imposition of ordinary MFN customs du-
ties.60 Other tariff preferences are permitted by the GATT, such
as the provisions for customs unions and free trade areas or
waivers. 61
C. EXPORT SUBSIDIES
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the GATT had very weak disci-
plines on export subsidies for agricultural commodities and
other primary products. 62 As noted before, the GATT provides
that if any WTO member grants or maintains any trade-dis-
torting subsidy,63 the member shall notify the WTO and consult,
on request, with other members on "the possibility of limiting
the subsidization."64 The GATT rules on export subsidies distin-
guish between primary products, defined as "any product of
farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or
which has undergone such processing as is customarily required
to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in interna-
tional trade"65 and other products.
The GATT exhorts WTO members to "avoid the use of subsi-
dies on the export of primary products."66 However, in the event
that any form of subsidy is directly or indirectly granted on the
export of any primary product, the GATT provides that "such
subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that
59. See GATT, supra note 15, art. I:l.
60. On June 5, 1971, the contracting parties of the GATT granted a waiver
from the most-favored-nation (MFN) obligations of Article I to permit developed
contracting parties to accord preferential tariff treatment to products originat-
ing in developing countries and territories on a "generalized, non-discrimina-
tory, and non-reciprocal" basis. GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1971).
61. See GATT, supra note 15, art. I:2&3 and XXIV; the waivers for the Car-
ibbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, GATT B.I.S.D. (31' Supp.) at 20 (1985)
and ANDEAN Trade Preference Act, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 188 (1993).
62. See Kevin J. Brosch, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in
THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY RouND AGREEMENTS ACT 866-867 (H.
Applebaum and L. Schlitt ed. 1995).
63. A trade-distorting domestic subsidy is a subsidy, including any form of
income or price support, which operates, directly or indirectly, to increase ex-
ports or to reduce imports of any product.
64. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVI:I.
65. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVI.
66. Id., art. XVI:3.
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contracting party having more than an equitable share of world
export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares
of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a
previous representative period, and any special factors which
may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the prod-
uct."67 GATT dispute settlement panels had considerable diffi-
culties determining what constitutes an equitable share of world
export trade.68 By contrast, the GATT rules essentially prohibit
export subsidies on non-primary products, including processed
agricultural products, if such subsidies "result in the sale of the
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic mar-
ket."69 As a practical matter, this rule now virtually prevents
export subsidies on non-primary products.70
III. THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Meeting during the world economic crisis of the early
1980's,7 1 the contracting parties of the GATT noted an increase
in protectionist pressures, a growing disregard of GATT disci-
plines, and shortcomings in the functioning of the GATT sys-
tem.72 With respect to agricultural trade, they undertook a work
program "to bring agriculture more fully into the multilateral
trading system by improving the effectiveness of GATT rules,
provisions and disciplines and through their common interpreta-
tion; to seek to improve terms of access to markets; and to bring
export competition under greater discipline."73 To do this they
established a Committee on Trade in Agriculture, chaired by
Mr. Aert De Zeeuw.74 In November 1984, the contracting parties
67. Id.
68. See EEC - Refunds on exports of sugar - complaint by Australia, GATT
B.I.S.D. (26'h Supp.) at 290 (1979); EEC - Refunds on exports of sugar - com-
plaint by Brazil, GATT B.I.S.D. (2 7' Supp.) at 69 (1980).
69. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVI:4.
70. See DAM, supra note 16, at 144-146; JACKSON, supra note 17, at 371-
376, 396-399.
71. See Mary Ann Normile and Mark Simone, U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., ECON.
RES. SERV., AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 2 (Mar. 29, 1999) <http:l
www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/wto/issues/uraa.htm>..
72. See Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th
Supp.) at 9 (1982).
73. Id. at 11-12.
74. See id. at 16-17. The Committee met during 1983 and 1984 to examine
market access and subsidies affecting trade. See Committee on Trade in Agri-
culture, Progress Report, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 100 (1983); Committee
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adopted the Committee's recommendations which called for
"substantially all measures affecting trade in agriculture [to be]
brought under more operationally effective GATT rules and dis-
ciplines" including quantitative restrictions (even if maintained
under waivers or exceptions), state trading enterprises, volun-
tary restraint agreements, variable levies and charges, unbound
tariffs, minimum import price arrangements, all subsidies af-
fecting trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. 75
In September 1986, a Special Session of the GATT con-
tracting parties meeting at the Ministerial level in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, launched the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations.76 With respect to agriculture, the contracting
parties agreed that there was an "urgent need to bring more dis-
cipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by cor-
recting and preventing restrictions and distortions including
those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncer-
tainty, imbalances and instability in world agricultural mar-
kets."77 The Punta del Este Declaration called for bringing "all
measures affecting import access and export competition under
strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and
disciplines" by improving market access, increasing discipline on
the use of all direct and indirect subsidies, and minimizing the
adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and
barriers can have on trade in agriculture.78 An Agricultural Ne-
gotiation Group,79 to be chaired by Mr. De Zeeuw, was estab-
lished to carry out the Puente del Este mandate.80
On July 7, 1987, the United States advanced its first propo-
sal for agricultural reform calling for a complete phase-out, over
10 years, of "all agricultural subsidies which directly or indi-
rectly affect trade" and all import barriers, as well as the harmo-
nization of health and sanitary regulations based on
on Trade in Agriculture, Final Report, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 209
(1984); see also CROOME, supra note 17, at 110-111.
75. GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 11 (1984).
76. See Ministerial Declaration, GATT B.I.S.D. (33rd Supp.) at 19 (1986).
77. Id. at 24.
78. Id. at 24, 40.
79. It has argued that the creation of a separate negotiating group for agri-
culture in previous rounds had operated to prevent a trade-off between agricul-
ture and industry. See TIMOTHY JOSLING, AGRICULTURE IN THE ToKYo ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS 11 (Thames Essay no. 10) (Ashford: Headly Brothers for the
Trade Policy Research Centre) (1977).
80. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 111-112.
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international standards. 8l This bold proposal was not supported
by the other participants in the negotiations, even the pro-re-
form Cairns Group,8 2 and may have impeded progress in the ne-
gotiations. 83 More than a year later, on August 28, 1988,
Congress authorized the President to enter into trade agree-
ments in the Uruguay Round8 4 and provided for "fast track" im-
plementation by the Congress.8 5 Congress also established trade
negotiating objectives with respect to agriculture designed to
protect existing farm programs.8 6 These objectives were sub-
stantially less ambitious than the United States proposal in
Geneva.87
After working from December 1988 through April 1989, the
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) concluded the Mid-Term
81. See GATT Secretariat, United States Proposal for Negotiations on Agri-
culture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/14 (July 7, 1987). Elaborations of the proposal with
respect to developing countries and food security were made in 1988. See GATT
Secretariat, Elaboration of United States Agriculture Proposal with Respect to
Developing Countries, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/55 (April 20, 1988); GATT Secreta-
riat, Elaboration of US Agriculture Proposal with Respect to Food Security,
MTN.GNG/NG5/W/61 (June 6, 1988).
82. The Cairns Group, formed in 1986, consisted of predominately agricul-
tural exporting countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colum-
bia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand,
and Uruguay. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 30.
83. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 114.
84. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
85. Id. at §1103. The original deadlines for reaching an agreement were
extended to December 15, 1993. See Kemet Elecs. Corp. v. Barshefsky, 969 F.
Supp. 82 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997).
86. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act §1101(a)(7). The agricul-
ture negotiating objectives were: (A) developing, strengthening, and clarifying
rules for agricultural trade, including disciplines on restrictive or trade-dis-
torting import and export practices; (B) increasing United States agricultural
exports by eliminating barriers to trade (including transparent and nontrans-
parent barriers) and reducing or eliminating the subsidization of agricultural
production consistent with the United States policy of agricultural stabilization
in cyclical and unpredictable markets; (C) creating a free and more open world
agricultural trading system by resolving questions pertaining to export and
other trade-distorting subsidies, market pricing and market access and elimi-
nating and reducing substantially other specific constraints to fair and more
open market access, such as tariffs, quotas, and other nontariff practices, in-
cluding unjustified phytosanitary and sanitary restrictions; and (D) seeking
agreements by which the major agricultural exporting nations agree to pursue
policies to reduce excessive production of agricultural commodities during peri-
ods of oversupply, with due regard for the fact that the United States already
undertakes such policies, and without recourse to arbitrary schemes to divide
market shares among major exporting countries.
87. See United States Proposal for Negotiations on Agriculture, supra note
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
Review of the Uruguay Round.8 8 The Ministers agreed that the
long-term objective of the agricultural negotiations was "to es-
tablish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system"
and "to provide for progressive reduction in agricultural support
and protection.., resulting in correcting and preventing restric-
tions and distortions in world agricultural markets."8 9 The
agreement on the agricultural provisions for the mid-term re-
view reinvigorated the negotiations. 90 The United States pro-
posed "tariffication" of non-tariff barriers to imports, the
European Communities elaborated the concept of an aggregate
measure of support, and the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Ja-
pan and other countries sought special treatment of non-trade
concerns. 9 1 The U.S. proposal also introduced the traffic light
concept for domestic support: the most trade distorting subsidies
would be banned (red light), less trade-distorting policies would
be subject to specific disciplines (yellow or amber light), and non-
trade distorting subsidies would be permitted (green light).92
In mid-1990, Mr. De Zeeuw advanced a draft framework
agreement that encompassed tariffication and an aggregate
measure of support and was broadly accepted by the United
States and the Cairns Group.93 In October, 1990, the EC sub-
mitted an offer calling for a 30 percent cut in an aggregate mea-
sure of support, with credit for reductions already taken, and
conversion of variable levies into fixed tariffs with a variable cor-
rective factor; the EC proposed nothing on export subsidies and
demanded the "rebalancing" of prior tariff concessions to account
for its duty free bindings for oilseeds.9 4 The United States soft-
ened its position and called for a 90 percent cut in export subsi-
dies, a 75 percent cut in red light subsidies, and a 30 percent cut
in amber subsidies.9 5 At the closing conference in Brussels, the
88. See Mid-Term Review: Final Agreement at Geneva, GATT: Focus News-
letter, May 1989, at 4.
89. Id.
90. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 233.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 234.
93. See CROOME, supra note 17.
94. Id. at 240.
95. See id.
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participants deadlocked on agriculture96 and the Uruguay
Round broke down.97
Following a year of technical discussions, Mr. Arthur
Dunkel,98 who had taken over as chairman of the Agriculture
Negotiating Group, issued a Draft Final Act, consisting of a part
A that became the basis for the negotiation of the Agreement on
Agriculture and a part B that was ultimately jettisoned.99 The
Draft Final Act provided for comprehensive tariffication with
tariff reductions averaging 36 percent and minimum reductions
of 15 percent; a 20 percent reduction of an aggregate measure of
support; and reduction of outlays of export subsidies by 36 per-
cent and volumes of subsidized exports by 24 percent. 100 The fol-
lowing year, farmers in Japan and Korea engaged in violent
riots and European farmers staged large disorderly
demonstrations. 101
The European Communities rejected the Draft Final Act
and began negotiations with the United States in 1992 for
amendments which became known as the Blair House agree-
ment. 10 2 These amendments provided for a 21 percent reduction
in the volume of subsidized exports and flexibility to make up
excesses in following years; allowed an additional exemption
from domestic support reductions for certain direct payments to
farmers (known as the "blue box"); and elaborated on a "peace
clause" to exempt, under certain conditions, agricultural subsi-
dies from the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Subsidies
96. The Swedish Agriculture Minister, Mr. Mats Hellstrom, attempted at
the last minute to procure a compromise by proposing essentially 30% reduc-
tions in domestic support, export subsidies and market access barriers, but this
was rejected by the EC, Japan and Korea. Id. at 278-279.
97. See CROOME, supra note 17.
98. Mr. Dunkel was the Director-General of the GATT until 1993. See id.
at 2.
99. See id. at 294-7; see also GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991); Dale E. McNiel, The NAFTA Panel Decision
on Canadian Tariff-Rate Quotas: Imagining a Tariffying Bargain, 22 YALE J.
INT'L L. 345, 359 (1997).
100. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 296.
101. See id. at 337. The Korean Minister of Agriculture was fired for agree-
ing to open the Korean rice market to imports. See Review of the Uruguay
Round GATT Agreement Implications for Agricultural Trade: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Agriculture, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 54 (1994)(statement of
Mike Espy, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture).
102. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 340.
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Agreement 10 3 for the 6-year transition period.' 0 4 This accord
was supplemented in the final days of the round by the Blair
House II agreement which extended the peace clause by 3 years
and reduced the pace of export subsidy reductions.' 0 5 Switzer-
land, Japan and Korea also negotiated last minute changes in
the market access provisions of the draft text with the United
States during the final week.l0 6 A quad group (known as the G-
4) finalized the legal language of the Agreement on Agriculture
during the last week of the negotiations. '0 7
IV. THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND ISSUES
FOR THE NEXT ROUND
A. DOMESTIC SUPPORT
The Agreement on Agriculture calls for reductions by 20
percent 0 8 in a "Total Aggregate Measurement of Support" (or
"Total AMS") over a 6-year implementation period from 1995 to
2000.109 The Total AMS is essentially a measure of all domestic
subsidies for all agricultural commodities, with certain excep-
103. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 1A [hereinafter Subsidies
Agreement].
104. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 340.
105. See id. at 368, 372.
106. See id. at 373; see also McNIEL, supra note 99, at 359.
107. The author participated in the meeting of this group.
108. The 1990 U.S. proposal in the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations
called for reductions in commodity-specific support by 75 percent over 10 years
and a 30 percent reduction in non-commodity-specific support. See UNITED
STATES OFFER SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO MTN.TNC/15 [hereinafter "U.S. PROPo-
sAL"] 1 (October 15, 1990). This position was supported by the Cairns Group.
See ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, HUNGARY, INDONESIA,
MALAYSIA, NEW ZEALAND, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, URUGUAY OFFER SUBMITTED
PURSUANT TO MTN.TNC/15 [hereinafter "CAIRS GROUP PROPOSAL"] 1 (October
15, 1990). The European Communities proposed 30 percent reductions in sup-
port for bulk commodities and 10 percent reductions for other products. See
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OFFER SUBMIrrED PURSUANT TO MTN.TNC/15 [herein-
after "EC PRoPoSAL"] 3 (November 6, 1990). Japan and Korea generally sup-
ported the EC position.
109. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 872. The Total AMS is "the sum of all
domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers, calculated as the
sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricultural products,
all non-product-specific aggregate measurements of support and all equivalent
measurements of support for agricultural products." See Agreement on Agricul-
ture, supra note 26, art. 1(h). The AMS must be calculated on a product-specific
basis for each basic product receiving market price support, non-exempt direct
payments, or any other subsidy not exempted from the reduction commitment.
Support which is non-product specific is totaled into one non-product-specific
AMS. Id. art. 1(a).
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tions.110 The calculation of the Total AMS was skewed to allow
WTO members to count "blue box" direct payments to farmers1 1 '
for purposes of the base Total AMS (from which the 20 percent
reduction commitment is measured) but to exclude such pay-
ments from the calculation of the current Total AMS which is
used to determine annual compliance. 11 2 This allowed U.S. defi-
ciency payments under the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills 1 13 and EC
compensation payments under the 1992 CAP reform to be
counted in calculating the base total AMS but to be excluded
from the calculation of the current total AMS. 1 4 As a conse-
quence of the smoke and mirrors, the major players received a
huge credit for using direct government expenditures and for re-
forms undertaken since Puente del Este, more than offsetting
the required 20 percent reduction, and were not required to
make any real reductions in domestic support."15
The "peace clause" provides that domestic support that con-
forms fully to the reduction commitments and exempt payments
consistent with the exemption provisions as well as domestic
110. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 872.
111. Direct payments under "blue box" production-limiting programs are not
subject to the reduction commitments, if such payments are based on fixed area
and yields, are made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production or are
livestock payments made on a fixed number of head. See Agreement on Agricul-
ture, supra note 26, art. 6.5.
112. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 1(h). Note that the
difference between the base total AMS and the current total AMS. The "Base
Total AMS" refers to support provided during the 1986-1988 base period, and
does not exclude blue box payments under Article 6.5. The "Annual and Final
Bound Commitment Levels" refer to the maximum support permitted to be pro-
vided during any year of the 6-year implementation period or thereafter. Com-
pliance is measured by the "Current Total AMS" which refers to the level of
support actually provided during any year and excludes blue box payments. Id.
Article 6.3 and 6.5.
113. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-624, 104 Stat. 3359 (1990).
114. See Mary Anne Normile, Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture:
The Record to Date, AGRic. OUTLOOK 28 (Dec. 1998); see also Paul C. Rosenthal
& Lynn E. Duffy, Reforming Global Trade in Agriculture, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 211 CENTURY AND
U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 145, 169 (Terence P. Stewart, ed., 1996).
115. See Frederick J. Nelson, Measuring Domestic Support for U.S. Agricul-
ture, WTO BRIEFING RooM, 24-25 (Nov. 1997) <http://www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/
wto/ams/august. htm>; U.S. Agriculture will Satisfy WTO Domestic Support
Commitments through 2000. See Frederick J. Nelson, U.S. Ag Policy - Well
Below WTO Ceilings on Domestic Support, AGRIC. OUTLOOK 26 (Oct. 1997). See
also 103d Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 101, at 56; World Trade and Agriculture:
The Challenges Ahead, Eur. Comm'n 2 (Nov. 4, 1996).
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support within de minimis levels, 116 are exempt until 2003 from
the imposition of countervailing duties, unless there is a deter-
mination of injury or threat thereof domestic support is also ex-
empt from actions based on the GATT 1994, the Subsidies
Agreement, or non-violation nullification or impairment of tariff
concessions, provided that such measures do not grant support
to a specific commodity in excess of that provided during the
1992 marketing year. 117
Domestic support in the "green box," which is provided
through a publicly-funded government program that does not in-
volve consumer transfers or provide price support to producers
and that has no, or at most minimal, trade distorting effects or
effects on production, are exempt from reduction commitments,
if specific criteria are met.118 Such permitted policies include
certain general services or benefits to agriculture or the rural
community involving research, pest and disease control, train-
ing services, extension and advisory services, inspection serv-
ices, marketing and promotion services, infrastructural services,
public stockholding for food security purposes, domestic food aid
as well as direct payments to producers, including decoupled in-
come support, government financial participation in income in-
surance and income safety-net programs, disaster relief
payments, structural adjustment assistance provided through
producer retirement programs, resource retirement programs,
or investment aids, and payments under environmental pro-
grams and regional assistance programs. 1 9
Domestic support measures that conform fully to the green
box provisions are non-actionable subsidies for purposes of coun-
tervailing duties, are exempt from dispute settlement com-
plaints based on the GATT 1994 and the Subsidies Agreement,
116. De minimis domestic support is also exempt from reduction. See Agree-
ment on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 6.4. For developed country members,
this includes product-specific domestic support which does not exceed 5 per cent
of the total value of production of a basic product during the relevant year and
non-product-specific domestic support which does not exceed 5 per cent of the
value of the total agricultural production. For developing country members, the
de minimis percentage is 10 per cent. Id.
117. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 13(b).
118. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, Annex 2.1
119. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, Annex 2.2-2.13. Data
submitted to the WTO by mid-1998 indicate that food aid accounts for $40.6
billion of green box expenditures, infrastructure funding accounts for $27.8 bil-
lion, investment aids were $12.0 billion, nonseparated general services were
$8.8 billion, research, extension & training totalled $7.9 billion, miscellaneous
general services came to $6.0 billion, and other green box expenditures were
$23.5 billion. See AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO, supra note 27 at 16.
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and are exempt from complaints based on non-violation nullifi-
cation or impairment of tariff concessions under the peace
clause.'120
1. Domestic Support Issues that will be Addressed in the next
Round
The first major issue is whether amber box domestic subsi-
dies should be subject to further reduction commitments or
should be eliminated. Few countries are constrained by their
commitments on AMS reductions. 121 Using the Total AMS ap-
proach, WTO members can increase subsidization of certain
commodities while reducing subsidization of other commodi-
ties. 122 Australia and the United States have called for further
substantial reductions and tightening of the AMS.123 Both coun-
tries have substantially reduced amber category subsidies. 124
This move is likely to be resisted by the European Union, Japan,
Norway, Switzerland, Korea and others 1 25 with some further
AMS reductions finally agreed upon.
The second major issue is whether "blue box" direct pay-
ments under production limiting programs should continue to be
exempt from reduction commitments. The United States and
Australia have questioned the basis for continuing the exemp-
tion from reduction commitments for direct payments to produ-
cers that are based on current production and characterize the
measures as "transitional.' 2 6 New Zealand has noted that only
the EU, Norway and the Slovak Republic are currently using
blue box measures and argues that such measures are not con-
sistent with the long term objective of substantial and progres-
120. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 13(a).
121. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 18. Only Switzer-
land, Korea, Brazil, Slovenia and Tunisia reported providing domestic support
at a level of 80 percent or more of their WTO commitments in 1995.
122. See Globalization And Liberalization: Development in the Face of Two
Powerful Currents, U.N. CTAD, 9' Sess., 46-47, U.N. Doc. TD/366/Rev. 1
(1996).
123. See Reforming Domestic Support for Agriculture, GAT Doc. AIE/27
(June 5, 1998) (paper by Australia).
124. The calculations show the United States and Australia at a level of 20
to 39 percent of their commitment levels. See AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO, supra
note 27, at 18, Table 4.
125. The percentage of amber support in these countries is European Union
- 54%, Japan - 52%, Norway - 47%, Switzerland - 61%, and Korea - 33%. See id.
126. See Article 6.5: Direct Payments Under Production-Limiting Programs,
GATT Doc., AIE/10 (Oct. 31, 1997) (paper by the United States); Article 6.5:
Direct Payments Under Production-Limiting Programs, GATT Doc., AIE/15
(Jan. 27, 1998) (comments by Australia).
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sive reductions in support and protection. 127 The EU supports
the current blue box exemption and denies that it was consid-
ered transitional. 128 The EU is moving away from market price
support toward direct blue box payments with the Common Ag-
ricultural Policy (CAP) reforms and in the Agenda 2000.129 This
power struggle could produce a further reform of exempt pay-
ments, particularly if the EU Commission moves toward reduc-
ing the share of the EU budget devoted to supporting
agriculture, but it is not likely that the next round will totally
ban domestic support that does not qualify for the green box of
permitted policies or the de minimis exemption.
A third major issue concerns whether green box permitted
policies need fine tuning. The specific criteria for decoupled in-
come support may not insure that such payments have no or
minimal effects on production and trade.130 Countries in East-
ern Europe that are in transition to market economies have ad-
vocated special treatment for domestic support measures used
by countries in transition to fully-fledged market systems or in
post-transition situations. 131
The transitional direct payments to farmers adopted by the
United States in the 1996 Farm Bill are claimed to be decoupled
income supports that belong in the green box even though they
are very substantial payments and have recently been in-
creased. 132 Both Australia and Canada, leading members of the
Cairns Group, have questioned the adequacy of green box condi-
tions to insure that the measures do not increase production or
distort trade and have suggested fine tuning of the criteria. 133
The United States has suggested that the green box is accepta-
127. See Domestic Support: Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture Blue
Box, GATT Doc., AIE/49 (Mar. 3, 1999) (paper by New Zealand).
128. See Direct Payments under Production-Limiting Programmes, GATT
Doc., AIE/14 (Jan. 20., 1998) (paper by the European Community); Domestic
Support Policy Reform: The Role of Article 6.5 Direct Payments, GATT Doc.,
AIE/29 (June 19, 1998) (paper by the European Community).
129. Domestic Support Policy Reform: The Role of Article 6.5 Direct Pay-
ments, supra note 129.
130. See AGRICULTuRE IN THE WTO, supra note 27, at 19.
131. See The Future Treatment of Domestic Support Commitments in the
Case of Transition and Post-Transition Economies, GATT Doc., AIE/45 (Nov.
19, 1998) (paper by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia).
132. See AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO, supra note 27, at 19.
133. See "Green Box" Domestic Support, GATT Doc., AIE/4 (May 16, 1997)
(paper by Australia); Annex 2: Domestic Support Measures Exempted From Re-
duction Commitments, GATT Doc., AIE/23 (June 2, 1998) (paper by Canada).
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ble,-34 and the European Union, which favored loose criteria in
the Uruguay Round, is unlikely to demand reforms. Thus,
changes to the green box are not likely.
B. MARKET AcCESS
The Uruguay Round negotiations on agricultural market ac-
cess focused on binding and reducing all agricultural tariffs,
tariffication of non-tariff barriers, maintaining current access
opportunities, providing for minimum access opportunities and
requiring progressive tariff reductions. 135 Tariffication meant
that non-tariff barriers on imports (e.g., embargoes, quotas, vari-
able levies, minimum import prices, discretionary licensing,
non-tariff measures maintained by state trading enterprises,
voluntary export restraint agreements and similar border meas-
ures) were to be converted into equivalent tariffs based on the
difference between domestic and world prices resulting from the
non-tariff measures. 136 The Agreement on Agriculture prohibits
WTO Members from maintaining, resorting to, or reverting to
any of the kinds of non-tariff measures which were required to
be converted into tariffs during the tariffication process.' 3 7
"Current access opportunities," defined as no less than the
average of annual import quantities for the years 1986 to 1988,
was to be maintained usually in the form of tariff-rate quotas. 13
In case there were no significant imports during the base period,
"minimum access" opportunities were to be provided equal to 3
percent of domestic consumption during the 1986-88 base period
as of the first year of implementation rising to 5 percent of base
134. See Domestic Support: Response to AIE/23 and AIE/27, GATT Doc.,
AIE/38 (Sep.15, 1998) (Paper by the United States).
135. See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Text on Agriculture, MTN.TNC/W/FA, L.1
(December 20, 1991) [hereinafter Draft Final Act].
136. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 875-876; see also ROSENTHAL, supra note
42, at 155-158.
137. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 4.2. A footnote lists
the prohibited measures as follows: "These measures include quantitative im-
port restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary
import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state trading enter-
prises, voluntary export restraints and similar border measures other than or-
dinary customs duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under
country-specific derogations from the provisions of the GATT 1947, but not
measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other
general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of the GATT 1994 or of the other
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex IA to the MTO."
138. See Draft Final Act, supra note 136, 6 at L.19, 11 at L.26.
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consumption by 2000.139 Exceptions to tariffication, known as
"special treatment," were negotiated with Japan and Korea in
return for greater minimum access volumes.140
All tariffs, including those resulting from tariffication, were
to be bound and reduced by an average of 36 percent (24 percent
by developing countries), with a minimum rate of reduction of 15
percent (10 percent by developing countries) for each tariff
item. 141 The reductions were to be straight line over 6 years,
from 1995 to 2000, for developed countries and over 10 years for
developing countries.' 42 Such tariffs are subject to the normal
provisions of the GATT on tariff obligations. 143 Least developed
countries were subject to tariffication and tariff binding but were
exempted from reductions of tariffs.'4
The use of an escape clause is permitted by the GATT
1994.145 During the Uruguay Round, a Safeguards Agreement
was reached which imposes disciplines on the use of the escape
clause.'146 Special safeguard provisions of the Agreement on Ag-
riculture allow the imposition of additional duties on agricul-
tural products that were subject to the tariffication of NTB's
when there are either import surges or particularly low prices
compared with 1986-88 levels.' 47
139. See id.
140. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, Annex 5; John Dyck, et
al., Rice Tariffication in Japan: What Does it Mean for Trade? AGRIC. OUTLOOK
13 (April 1999). Japan, Korea and the Philippines invoked minimum access on
rice, and Israel invoked minimum access on sheep meat. Japan has since tarif-
fled its rice quota. See Japanese Plans on Rice Tariffication, Self-Sufficiency
Stir Simmering Concerns, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (Dec. 9, 1998); Gary G. Yerkey,
U.S. Will Not Take Japan to WTO on Rice Import Regime for Now, Scher Says,
16 INTL TRADE REP. 488 (Mar. 24, 1999).
141. See Draft Final Act, supra note 136, 5 at L.19.
142. See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Imple-
menting Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, and Required Supporting
Statements, Message from the President, H.R. Doc. 103-316, 103d Cong. 2d
Sess. (1994), at 713.
143. See id.
144. See id; see also ROSENTHAL, supra note 42, at 158.
145. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XIX:I(a). Resort to the escape clause
requires that a surge in imports results from unforeseen developments and
from obligations incurred under the GATT such as tariff concessions.
146. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 15, Annex 1A, 315 reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS.
147. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 5.
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The results have been applauded for eliminating a plethora
of non-tariff measures as well as criticized for leaving many
markets essentially closed. 14 8 The widespread departure from
the modalities for tariffication, 14 9 known as "dirty tarif-
fication,"150 resulted in tariff equivalents that far exceeded
price gaps 15 ' and some tariffs that exceeded prior tariff bind-
ings. 152 Some countries offered other commitments for certain
commodities, such as the EC bindings on margins of prefer-
ence for cereals and rice.' 53 The flexibility to reduce some
sensitive tariffs only by 15 percent meant that countries,
in meeting the 36 percent average, could choose to make
big reductions in other tariffs for which there was little or
no trade.' 5 4 Even after the tariff reductions, many imported
commodities will be facing very high tariff peaks in many coun-
148. See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, The President's Advisory
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, Report on WTO Implementation:
Cementing and Improving Existing Agreements (Mar. 11, 1996).
149. See Draft Final Act, supra note 136, at Part B, para.3-7 (page L.19) and
Annex 3 (page L.26); see also Agricultural Provisions of the Uruguay Round
Draft Final Act ("The Dunkel Text") U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. 16-17 (Sep. 1992);
Implications of a GATT Agreement for World Commodity Markets, 1993-1998:
An Analysis of the Dunkel Text on Agriculture, Food and Agricultural Policy
Research Institute (FAPRI), April 1992.
150. See TROY PODBURY AND IvAN ROBERTS, WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIA-
TIONS: IMPORTANT MARKET ACCESS ISSUES, ABARE Research Report 99.3, 15-17
(Feb. 1999); see also ROSENTHAL, supra note 42, at 158.
151. See AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO, supra note 27, at 8. On average, EU
tariff equivalents were in excess of actual price gaps by 60% and U.S. tariff
equivalents were 45% above actual price gaps. See ESCAP Agricultural Policy
Reform under the Uruguay Round: Implications for Developing Countries of the
ESCAP Region (1996); U.N. Asian and Pacific Developing Economies and the
First WTO Ministerial Conference: Issues of Concern, United Nations (1996).
152. See McNIEL, supra note 99, at 365-376.
153. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 876; see also European Communities -
Duties on Imports of Grains, GATT Doc., WT/DS13/1 (July 26, 1995) (complaint
by the United States concerning EC regulations which imposed a duty on wheat
imports based on reference prices rather than transaction values. On 30 April
1997, the US withdrew its request for a panel due to the EC implementing an
agreement on this matter.)
154. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 875. An FAO study found that most tariff
wedges decreased as a result of the Uruguay Round despite the flexibility on
tariff reductions. See JOSTEIN LINDLAND, THE IMPACT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
ON TARIFF ESCALATION IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 27 (Sep. 1997); see also Uru-
guay Round Agreement on Agriculture: The Record to Date, supra note 114.
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tries 55 such as the Japanese tariffs on imported rice at 450 per-
cent.l5 6
The principal market access issue for the next round will be
the extent of tariff reductions and whether to use a formula for
tariff reductions or the request/offer method.' 57 Some countries
have also raised issues on the administration of tariff quotas in
the Analysis and Exchange of Information Process under the
WTO Committee on Agriculture. 58
The rate of tariff reductions for agricultural imports could
become one of the central issue of the negotiations. Agricultural
market access has been separated from the negotiations on in-
dustrial goods in the past three rounds, and with the great dis-
parity in average tariff rates it is not likely that the negotiations
will combine these subjects in the upcoming round.I' 9 The
United States Trade Representative's Office has been vague
about the issue, saying at most that WTO Members "should
agree to pursue an outcome that is ambitious" and "should agree
155. See The Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Environment for Developing Coun-
try Exports, U.N. CTAD, 2d Sess., at 4-6, TD/B/COM.1/14 (Oct. 6, 1997). This
study found the highest tariffs rates and highest frequencies of tariff peaks in
the area of major agricultural staple foods, particularly meat, sugar, milk, but-
ter and cheese, and cereals, as well as tobacco, and cotton. Id. at 4. See also
Access to European Union Markets for Agricultural Products After the Uruguay
Round, and Export Interests of the Mediterranean Countries, U.N. CTAD at 8,
INT/93/A34 (Apr. 9, 1997).
156. Japan has undertaken delayed tariffication of its former ban on rice
imports. See Rice Tariffication in Japan, supra note 141; see also Japanese
Plans on Rice Tariffication, supra note 141.
157. The WTO Secretariat has prepared numerous background papers on
tariff issues for the Analysis and Exchange of Information Process under the
WTO Committee on Agriculture. See Tariffs and Other Quotas, GATT Doc.,
AIE/S1 (Sep. 9, 1997) (background paper by the Secretariat); Tariff Quota Ad-
ministration Methods and Tariff Quota Fill, GAIT Doc., AIE/S4 (Nov. 6, 1997)
(background paper by the Secretariat); Ad valorem, Specific and other Tariffs,
GATT Doc., AIE/S5 (Feb. 6, 1998) (background paper by the Secretariat); Uru-
guay Round Agricultural Tariff Reductions for Selected WTO Members Accord-
ing to Stage of Processing, GATT Doc., AIE/Sll (June 23, 1998) (background
paper by the Secretariat).
158. See Tariff Quota Administration Methods and Tariff Quota Fill, GATT
Doc., AIE/S4 (Nov. 6, 1997) (background paper by the Secretariat); Administra-
tion of Tariff Quotas, GATT Doc., AIF_1 (May 13, 1997) (paper by Australia);
Tariff Quota Administration, GATT Doc., AIE/5 (Aug. 12, 1997) (paper submit-
ted by New Zealand); Administration of Tariff Quotas, GATT Doc., AIE/7 (Oct.
22, 1997) (submission by the United States); Tariff Quota Administration:
First-Come First-Served, GATT Doc., AIE/9 (Oct. 29, 1997) (paper by Australia);
Administration of Tariff Quotas, GATT Doc., AIE/46 (Mar. 2, 1997) (paper by
the United States).
159. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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that the results will improve and expand market access."160
Meanwhile, Vice President Gore has announced that the United
States "will call for broad and deep reductions in agricultural
tariffs." 61 The American Farm Bureau Federation has been
calling for the progressive elimination of tariffs on all agricul-
tural commodities and products.16 2 The Cairns Group has sup-
ported substantial reductions in agricultural tariffs, 63 and a
recent Australian study estimated that a 50 percent reduction of
all agricultural protection would generate an additional US $ 90
billion of net global welfare.164 However, with agricultural tar-
iffs averaging over 21 percent (as compared to 9 percent in the
United States), 6 5 the European Community is not likely to
favor substantial tariff reductions.
The methodology for tariff reductions raises related issues:
whether a request/offer approach or formula approach should be
used, and if the latter, whether it should reduce tariff peaks
more than lower tariffs.' 66 The flexible reduction formula used
in the Uruguay Round allowed participants to make the small-
160. See Preparations for the 1999 WTO Ministerial General Council Discus-
sion on Mandated Negotiations and the Built-In Agenda,(Nov. 23, 1998) (Sub-
mission from the United States of America).
161. See Speech by Vice President Al Gore Before the World Economic Fo-
rum, Davos (Jan. 29, 1999) (transcript available at <http://www.white
house.gov/WH/EOP/OVP/speeches/davos.html>).
162. See Hearing on the Committee's Trade Agenda for the 1 0 6h Congress
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 106' Cong. (Jan. 27, 1999) (Statement of
Dean Kleckner, President of the American Farm Bureau Federation); U.S.
Farm Leader Echoes Cairns Group Concerns, (Mar. 31, 1998) <http://
www.cairnsgroupfarmers.org / ni/press / march31.htm.>
163. See Cairns Group, Cairns Group 'Vision' for the WTO Agriculture Nego-
tiations: 'Completing the Task' (Apr. 3, 1998), available at <httpJ/or-
pheus.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/cairns-group/vision.html> The vision
statement provides as follows: "Access opportunities for agricultural products
should be on the same conditions as those applying to other goods and should be
commercially viable. Tariffs must be the only form of protection, tariff escala-
tion must be removed and tariff peaks curtailed. The 1999 negotiations must
result in deep cuts to all tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation. They must
provide a major expansion of market access opportunities for agricultural prod-
ucts, including value-added products. The removal of non-tariff barriers must
be completed without exception. Trade volumes under tariff rate quotas must
be increased substantially. The administration of tariff rate quotas must not
diminish the size and value of market access opportunities, particularly in
products of special interest to developing countries."
164. See AusTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GLOBAL
TRADE REFORM: MAINTAINING MOMENTuM 27 (1999).
165. See United States Ambassador Genta Hawkins Holmes, Address
Before the Pastoralists and Graziers Association of Western Australia (Feb. 24,
1999).
166. See Ag in the WTO, supra note 27, at 10.
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est reductions on their trade sensitive products.167 If a request/
offer approach is used, countries can be expected to try to main-
tain protection for their most trade sensitive crops. 168 The so-
called Swiss formula used in the Tokyo Round for industrial tar-
iffs reduced higher tariffs by greater percentages than for lower
tariffs and could serve as a model for those countries seeking
major reductions in high tariffs. 69 At this point it would appear
likely that the Cairns Group would favor tariff reductions of at
least 50 percent or more across the board for tariff peaks.170 It
is uncertain what position the United States will take, and it is
likely that the European Union and Japan will favor much more
modest reductions. 171
The principal issue concerning tariff quota administration
involves who will receive the quota rents or premiums, repre-
sented roughly by the difference between the world price for the
product and the importing country's domestic price resulting
from the tariff quota, taking account of transportation and other
costs. 17 2 Generally, tariff quotas 7 3 are either global or allocated
among supplying countries.' 7 4 In either case, a tariff quota may
be administered on a first-come, first-served basis or adminis-
tered through licensing.' 7 5 If licensing is used, either importers
167. See id. at 8.
168. See id. at 10.
169. See id.
170. See Cairns Group, supra note 164.
171. The U.S. Trade Representative has endorsed "across-the-board" tariff
reductions, but has been reticent about reduction rates. See Testimony of Am-
bassador Barshefsky, supra note 2, at 6; U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky, America's Agricultural Trade Agenda, Address Before the National
Association of Agricultural Journalists, Washington, D.C. (April 19, 1999)
(transcript available at <http://www.ustr.gov/speeches/barshefsky/barshef
sky_34.html>.
172. See Philip C. Abbott, Market Access and Quota Rents in European Com-
munity Beef Trade, INVESTIGACION AGRARIA ECONOMIA (1993); Thomas Grennes,
The Collision Course on Textile Quotas, CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No.
140 (Sept. 12, 1990) available at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-
140es.html>); Patrick D. Henneberry and S.L. Haley, Implications of NAFTA
Duty Reductions for the U.S. Sugar Market, ERS, SUGAR AND SWEETENER
(Feb.2, 1999); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER AND KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTr, MEASURING
THE COSTS OF PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES (1994); Jonathan Tolman,
Consumers Shell Out For Peanut Program, THE ST.LouIs POST DISPATCH, Aug.
31, 1995 at 7B.
173. A tariff quota allows a specified quantity of imports to enter at a "low"
duty rate or duty free and subjects any additional imports to a higher, "over-
quota," rate of duty. See ROOT, supra note 22 at 135.
174. See id. at 134.
175. See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 305-306.
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or exporters may be licensed.' 76 The licenses may be issued to
importers (or exporters) on the basis of historical performance,
by lottery, by auction, on the basis of first-come/first-served or on
some other basis. 177
Very few tariff quotas are deliberately administered in a
manner that results in exporters obtaining quota rents.' 78 Ar-
gentina has pursued WTO dispute settlement consultations
with the United States on a claim that during the Uruguay
Round trade negotiations it was promised quota rents on pea-
nuts and peanut butter exported to the United States.1 79 How-
ever, the importing country normally must cooperate in order for
foreign exporters to receive quota rents.°80 During the Uruguay
Round, there was no real attempt to reach a concensus on quota
rents, and it is not likely that there will be any general agree-
ment on this subject in the upcoming trade negotiations except
possibly on a case-by-case basis in bilateral talks.
A second major issue involves whether the administrative
burden of complying with the conditions of entries restricts or
distorts importations in addition to the tariff quota effects which
may cause under-utilization of a tariff quota.' 8 ' Quota alloca-
tions or license quantities that are not commercially viable
quantities, licenses issued to domestic producers or processors
with interests adverse to imports, imposing end-use conditions,
and other actions can limit import access.'8 2 A share of a tariff
176. See David W. Skully, Auctioning Tariff Quotas for U.S. Sugar Imports,
ERS, SUGAR AND SWEETENER 17 (June 30, 1998). The exporting countries under
U.S. sugar tariff-rate quota receive certificates of quota eligibility that are es-
sentially export licenses issued by the importing country. See 15 C.F.R. pt.
2011, Subpt. A. This enables the exporters to capture the quota rents. See
Skully supra.
177. See WTO Secretariat, Tariff Quota Administration Methods and Tariff
Quota Fill 2 GATT Doc. AIE/S4 (Nov. 6, 1997).
178. The U.S. tariff quota for raw sugar is an example of a tariff quota ad-
ministered so that exporters receive quota rents. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 2011, subpt
A.
179. See United States - Tariff Quota for Imports of Groundnuts, (Dec. 19,
1997) (Request for Consultations by Argentina) available at http:l
www.wto.org/newsroom/media/no95.htm>.
180. See for example U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Record of Understanding
Between the Governments of the United States of America and Canada Regard-
ing Areas of Agricultural Trade 14 (Dec. 4, 1998), in which the United States
agreed to enforce export permits issued by Canada for sugar-containing prod-
ucts under U.S. tariff-rate quotas.
181. See WTO Secretariat, supra note 178.
182. See id; see also UNCTAD, Non-Tariff Barriers Affecting the Trade of
Developing Countries and Transparency in World Trading Conditions: The In-
ventory of Non-Tariff Barriers (1983).
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quota may be reserved for a party of a free trade agreement with
the importing country.18 3
Most of the concerns about tariff quota administration are
already covered by the provisions of the GATT and the WTO
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.'" These have been
determined to be applicable to agricultural tariff quotas in the
infamous EU banana case.' 8 5 The GATT generally requires
non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restric-
tions.18 6 With respect to the allocation of quotas and tariff quo-
tas, the GATT mandates an effort to maintain the distribution of
trade that would exist without the restriction, and requires that
the allocations be negotiated with substantial suppliers or that
they be based on a prior representative period.' 8 7 The Licensing
Agreement prohibits non-automatic import licensing that has
additional trade restricting or distorting effects or that is more
administratively burdensome than necessary.' 88
Auctioning import licenses, which results in the importing
country collecting a fee or charge for the license, raises another
legal issue. The GATT prohibits imposing "on or in connection
with importation" of any product any fees or charges of any kind
other than ordinary customs duties, grandfathered charges, an-
tidumping or countervailing duties, internal taxes or certain
user fees.' 8 9 Accordingly, the existing GATT rules would appear
to prohibit auctioning import licenses because the license fee
would be imposed "in connection with" importation. In addition,
since traders could be expected to bid up to the amount of the
quota rents less transaction costs for auctioned licenses, the im-
porting country effectively raises the in-quota tariff rate to virtu-
ally the same level as the out-of-quota tariff rate when the cost
of the license is factored in, which would impair the value of the
tariff quota concession.
183. See Panel on Newsprint, Nov. 20, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at
114 (1984).
184. See Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, [hereinafter Licensing Agreement], Annex 1A,, supra note 15, in
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MuLTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
255-263 (1994).
185. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on the United States Complaint Con-
cerning EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
May 22, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/USA, 331 (1997).
186. See GATT, supra note 15, at art. XIII:I.
187. See id. at art. XIII:2.
188. See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316,AT
902, 908 (1994).
189. See GATT, supra note 15, art. II:1(b) and art. VIII:1(a).
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Concerns about special agricultural safeguards have been
expressed by the United States and New Zealand. 190 The princi-
pal issue is whether the special safeguard should be retained
after the Uruguay Round implementation period.19 1 The special
safeguard was intended to encourage participants in the Uru-
guay Round negotiations to undertake tariffication, specifically
to reduce the perceived risks of converting non-tariff barriers to
tariff equivalents. 192 Experience has demonstrated that it gen-
erally has not been necessary, and only Japan and the EU have
made extensive use of it. 19 3 The limited use of the special safe-
guard undermines the justification for its continuation. How-
ever, the Agreement on Agriculture clearly provides for its
continuation throughout the reform process.' 9 4 Further reduc-
tions of over-quota tariff rates will make imposition of the spe-
cial safeguard more likely and more frequent, creating
uncertainties among exporters and undermining the effects of
tariff reductions. It is likely that the United States and the
Cairns Group will support elimination of the special safeguard
in the next round.
C. EXPORT SUBSIDIES
In 1776, Adam Smith argued against the British use of ex-
port subsidies on corn by noting that their effect "can only be to
force the trade of a country into a channel much less advanta-
geous than that in which it would naturally run of its own ac-
cord."195 Two hundred years later, the U.S.-EC trade war,
fought with agricultural export subsidies designed to deal with
chronic overproduction, may have been the single most impor-
190. See WTO Secretariat, Committee on Agriculture: Summary Report of
The Meeting Held on 19-20 March 1998, at 6, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/14 30 (April
1998). The concerns were described as follows: "The use of the special safeguard
involved no injury test and thus had the potential to be used in an arbitrary
fashion; that the volume-based special safeguard could be implemented on the
basis of a zero trigger level or when tariff quotas were under-filled; that the
price-based safeguard was being applied to minuscule import quantities; and
that greater transparency regarding the use of the special safeguard was
required."
191. See id.
192. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 877. See also Rosenthal, supra note 42, at
160-161.
193. See WTO Committee on Agriculture, Special Agricultural Safeguard,
GATT Doc. AIE/12, (1999) (Corrigendum).
194. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, at art. 5.
195. See ADn SMiTH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 446 (Everyman's Library
Ed.) (1776).
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tant element in the push to launch the Uruguay Round. 196 The
reduction of export subsidies became the most controversial is-
sue in the agriculture negotiations and the crux of the Blair
House deal that allowed a conclusion. 197
In the Uruguay Round WTO Members agreed to ban all ex-
port subsidies for non-agricultural products in the Subsidies
Agreement 198 and to bind and reduce the level of budgetary out-
lays for agricultural export subsidies and the quantities of ex-
ported agricultural products benefitting from export subsidies in
the Agreement on Agriculture. 199 Agricultural export subsidies
were conditionally exempted from the general ban in the Subsi-
dies Agreement for 9 years by the so-called peace clause.200
In general, the developed countries were expected to make
reductions of 36 percent in budgetary outlays and 21 percent in
volumes over six years (1995-2000), from a 1986-1990 base pe-
riod.201 The precise commitments are reflected in twenty-five
WTO Member's Schedules of Concessions. 20 2 The export sub-
sidy commitments are on the basis of 18 standard commodity
groups, and a Member cannot shift subsidization from one group
to another.20 3 The budgetary outlay and quantity commitments
are for each commodity group and are independent; a Member is
prohibited from exceeding either commitment. 20 4 More than
80% of the budgetary outlays for agricultural export subsidies
are made by the European Union. 205
The Agreement on Agriculture permitted some flexibility in
the use of export subsidies in order to accommodate the EC sys-
196. See Alan Charles Raul & Kevin J. Brosch, Global Trade in Agricultural
Products, in TRADE LAw AND POLICY INSTITUTE 1989, at 239-243 (PLI Comm.
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 510, 1989); Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A Threat to the GATT and Global Free
Trade, 24 ST. MARY's L. J. 1165-1168 (1993); Susan Leetma & Karen Acker-
man, Export Subsidies 1, ERS WTO Briefing Room at <http://151.121.66.126/
Briefing/WTO/issues/export.htm>.
197. See CROOME, supra note 17, at 340.
198. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 15 at art. 3.
199. Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture defines "export subsidies"
by providing that they refer to "subsidies contingent upon export performance,
including the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement."
200. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, at art. 13(c).
201. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 868.
202. See id; see also Economic Research Service, supra note 27, at 3.
203. See id. at 869.
204. See id.
205. See Leetmaa and Ackerman, supra note 197. South Africa has since
terminated the use of export subsidies. See id.
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tem of automatic export restitutions, which could not be finely
tuned to stop when the ceilings were reached.20 6 Subsequently,
the European Union claimed that the flexibility provision permit
a rollover of unused outlays and quantities for future years, and
the United States has also invoked the rollover option.20 7
Only export subsidies listed in the agreement are subject to
reduction. 20 8 Export subsidies not subject to reduction commit-
ments are subject to the anti-circumvention provisions, which
prohibit a WTO Member from providing export subsidies not
provided for in its Schedule of Concessions in a manner which
results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export
subsidy commitments or using non-commercial transactions to
circumvent reduction commitments. 20 9 Many have viewed this
as a virtual prohibition on export subsidies that are not subject
to reduction. 2 10
A WTO dispute settlement panel has ruled that Canada vio-
lated its export subsidy quantity commitments for butter, cheese
and certain other milk products by providing milk for producing
products for export at prices lower than for making domestic
206. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 9.2(b).
207. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Defends Agriculture Subsidy Rollover at WTO,
Despite Commitment to Phaseout, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 13, at 538-39
(Mar. 31, 1999); Major Farm Producers Clash Over WTO Export Subsidies
Rules, Inside U.S. Trade, available at <http://www.insidetrade.com> (Oct. 10,
1997). The United States initially objected to the EU rollover on grounds of the
intention of the negotiators, and the Cairns Group has continued this interpre-
tation. See id.
208. These include the provision by governments or their agencies of direct
subsidies, including payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of
an agricultural product, to a co-operative or other association of such producers,
or to a marketing board, contingent on export performance; the sale or disposal
for export by governments or their agencies of non-commercial stocks of agricul-
tural products at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market; payments on the export of an agricul-
tural product that are financed by virtue of governmental action, whether or not
a charge on the public account is involved, including payments that are fi-
nanced from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product con-
cerned or on an agricultural product from which the exported product is
derived; the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of
agricultural products (other than widely available export promotion and advi-
sory services) including handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and
the costs of international transport and freight; internal transport and freight
charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms
more favorable than for domestic shipments; subsidies on agricultural products
contingent on their incorporation in exported products. See Agreement on Agri-
culture, supra note 26, Arts. 3.3 and 9.1.
209. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 10.1.
210. See Brosch, supra note 25, at 869; Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 163.
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products violates Canada's commitments on export subsidies. 211
The panel decided that Canada's differential pricing scheme,
adopted in response to the Uruguay Round commitments, con-
stitutes an export subsidy subject to reduction both in the form
of payments in kind provided by governmental agencies to
processors/exporters contingent on export performance 212 and as
payments on the export of an agricultural product that are fi-
nanced by virtue of governmental action.213 In the alternative,
in the event that the Canadian policy did not amount to export
subsidies subject to reduction, the panel found that the differen-
tial pricing scheme nonetheless circumvented Canada's reduc-
tion commitments by exceeding the commitment levels. 214
The major issue is whether export subsidies for agricultural
products should be further reduced or eliminated. 215 The Cairns
Group has advocated a total elimination of export subsidies 216
and the United States has formally proposed a ban as well. 217
Since the Subsidies Agreement's outright ban on the use of ex-
port subsidies will apply to agricultural products in 2003 unless
there is an agreement to extend the exemption provided by the
peace clause, the countries desiring to continue to provide export
subsidies, primarily those in the European Union, will have to
pay a price for the privilege in terms of other concessions. Other
Members which may side with the EU on other issues, like Ja-
pan and Korea, may have no common ground on the export sub-
sidy issue, since such subsidies depress world prices and
threaten their own internal prices.
Another issue is whether there should be an additional
trade remedy for violations of export subsidy commitments. The
normal practice in WTO disputes is for the panel finding a WTO
agreement violation to recommend that the offending party
211. See Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Ex-
portation of Dairy Products at 203 (WT/DS103/R) (Mar. 17, 1999) (Final Report
of the Dispute Settlement Panel).
212. See id. at 182.
213. See id. at 189.
214. See id. at 196-197.
215. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU Continue to Be on Course For Fight Over
Farm Trade in WTO Talks, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 626-27 (April
14, 1999).
216. See World Trade Organization, Special Session of the General Council:
Cairns Group Ministerial Statement on Export Subsidies, (WT/GC/12) (Sept. 24,
1998).
217. See World Trade Organization, Special Session of the General Council,
(Sept. 23, 1998) (Submission from the United States of America).
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bring its practice into conformity with its obligations. 218 The
current agreement provides an explicit remedy for violations of
export subsidy reduction commitments in the "payback" under
the flexibility provisions under which the quantities or outlays
exceeding export subsidy commitments in one year would have
to be deducted from the commitment levels for the following
year.219 Such exports could also be subject to countervailing du-
ties imposed by the importing countries and would not be
shielded by the peace clause.220 A remedy in the form of ordi-
nary retaliation, by imposing tariffs on products imported from
the offending country, might be possible after completing the
dispute settlement process. 221
D. STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES
The United States Trade Representative has identified
transparency and improved disciplines for state trading enter-
prises as priority issues for the next round of multilateral trade
negotiations on agriculture.222 Such entities are common in ag-
ricultural trade223 and may have monopoly control over imports
or exports or both. 224 State trading enterprises with import mo-
nopolies can restrict imports and subsidize domestic produc-
tion.225 As single desk exporters, they can subsidize exports of
agricultural products.226 The accession of China, Russia and
218. See Richard 0. Cunningham, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Did We
Get What the United States [Wanted], Or Did We Give Up the Only Remedy that
Really Worked? in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS
ACT 1990, at 547, 559 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
A-722, 1995).
219. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 26, art. 9.2.
220. See McNiel, supra note 99, at 302-305.
221. This remedy has not been used yet, but there is no obvious reason why
it might not be used. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement supra note 15, Annex 2, art. 22.
222. See Testimony of Ambassador Barshefsky, supra note 2, at 6.
223. See State Trading Enterprises - Summary of Country Notifications Sub-
mitted to the World Trade Organization under Title XVII 4(a) of the GATT,
available at <http'//www.dairytrade.com/stetable.htm.>
224. See Karen Ackerman, State Trading Enterprises in World Agricultural
Trade, AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO 43 (Dec. 1998); John H. Jackson, State Trad-
ing and Nonmarket Economies, 23 INT'L LAWYER 891 (Winter 1989).
225. See Karen Ackerman, State Trading Enterprises: Their Role as Import-
ers, AGRiC. OUTLOOK 31-32 (Nov. 1997). Major single desk state trading enter-
prise importers in agricultural trade include COFCO (China), the Food Agency
(Japan), BULOG (Indonesia), LPMO (Korea), Ministry of Food, Agriculture and
Cooperatives (Pakistan); and CONASUPO (Mexico). See id. at 32.
226. See Karen Ackerman, Praveen Dixit, & Mark Simone, State Trading
Enterprises: Their Role in World Markets, AGRIC. OUTLOOK 11, 14 (June 1997).
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other non-market or transition countries highlights the difficul-
ties of disciplining state trading enterprises operating in the
world market of private traders and competitive markets.
1. GATT Obligations
The GATT applies to any state trading enterprise estab-
lished or maintained by a WTO Member and any other enter-
prise which has been granted, formally or in effect, "exclusive or
special privileges" 227 with respect to imports or exports.228 This
includes all "governmental and non-governmental enterprises,
including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive
or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitu-
tional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through
their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or ex-
ports."229 Thus, a privately-owned firm operating under a gov-
ernmentally-created import or export monopoly is covered as
well as marketing boards which engage in buying and selling
under exclusive or special rights or privileges. 230
A state trading enterprise is required to conform to the
most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, 23 l which prohibits dis-
criminating between countries with respect to imports and ex-
ports, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or
exports. 232 However, a state trading enterprise does not violate
the GATT simply because it is controlled by domestic produ-
cers. 23 3 GATT dispute settlement panels have indicated that the
disciplines on discrimination by state trading enterprises do not
include the national treatment principle 234 which bans discrimi-
Major single desk exporters include the Canadian Wheat Board (Canada), the
New Zealand Dairy Board (New Zealand), AWB (Australia), Queensland Sugar
Corp. (Australia), and COFCO (China).
227. This does not include government measures to insure standards of
quality and efficiency in the operation of external trade or privileges granted for
the exploitation of natural resources. See GATT, supra note 15, Annex I, ad art.
XVII:1(a).
228. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVII:I(a).
229. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 15, para. 1 [hereinafter Understanding on Article XVII].
230. See GATT, supra note 15, Annex I, ad art. XVIII.
231. See GATT, supra note 15, art. I:1.
232. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVII:I(a).
233. See Republic of Korea - Restrictions on Imports of Beef, Nov. 7, 1989,
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 268, 301-02 (1989).
234. See GATT, supra note 15, art. III.
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nation between imports and like domestic products.235 If the
state trading enterprise maintains an import monopoly for a
product which has a bound tariff, the state trading enterprise
must not "afford protection on the average in excess of the
amount of protection" provided for by the bound tariff rate.236
A state trading enterprise must make any imports or ex-
ports "solely in accordance with commercial considerations, in-
cluding price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation
and other conditions of purchase or sale."237 A state trading en-
terprise is also required to "afford the enterprises of the other
contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with
customary business practice, to compete for participation in
such purchases or sales." State trading enterprise activities for
government procurement is explicitly exempted from the GATT
disciplines. 238 The GATT also authorizes trade negotiations to
limit or reduce obstacles to trade resulting from the operation of
state trading enterprises. 239
Several GATT disciplines on state trading enterprises ad-
dress transparency. WTO Members are required to notify the
WTO of the products which are imported into, or exported from,
their territories by state trading enterprises. 240 Moreover, the
WTO may, at the request of a Member which has reason to be-
lieve that its interests are being adversely affected by the opera-
tions of an state trading enterprise, request the Member
235. See Belgian Family Allowances Nov. 7, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1 t Supp.)
at 59, 60 (1952). But see Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment
Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (3 0' Supp.) at 140, 163 (1984).
236. See id. If the state trading enterprise maintains an import monopoly
for a product which has an unbound tariff, that WTO Member must, on the
request of another Member having a substantial trade in the product con-
cerned, inform the WTO of "the import mark-up on the product during a recent
representative period, or, when it is not possible to do so, of the price charged on
the resale of the product." See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVII:4(b).
237. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVII:1(b). A panel has ruled that the
"commercial considerations criterion becomes relevant only after it has been
determined that the governmental action at issue falls within the scope of the
general principles of non-discriminatory treatment." Canada - Administration
of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (3 0th Supp.)
at 140, 163 (1984). A tied loan is a commercial consideration that may be taken
into account in making import decisions. See GATT, supra note 15, at Annex I,
ad art. XVII, para. 1(b).
238. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVII:2.
239. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVII:3.
240. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XVII:4(a).
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maintaining the state trading enterprise to supply relevant in-
formation about its operations. 241
2. The Uruguay Round and Issues for the Next Round
An Understanding reached during the Uruguay Round re-
quired the reporting of state trading enterprises to the WTO and
established a working party to review the notifications. 242 WTO
Members are required to notify243 the Council for Trade in
Goods of state trading enterprises "in order to ensure the trans-
parency of the activities of state trading enterprises" 2'4 whether
or not imports or exports have in fact taken place. 245 Each WTO
Member is called upon to "ensure the maximum transparency
possible in its notifications so as to permit a clear appreciation of
the manner of operation of the enterprises notified and the effect
of their operations on international trade."246 Any WTO Mem-
ber which believes that another Member has not provided ade-
quate notification may complain to the other Member. If the
matter is not satisfactorily resolved, the member may make a
counter-notification for consideration by the working party.247
The working party24 8 reviews notifications and counter-no-
tifications. 249 The working party meets at least once a year and
reports annually to the Council for Trade in Goods, which is au-
thorized to make recommendations with regard to the adequacy
of notifications and the need for further information. 250
241. Id. at art. XVII:4(c). Certain confidential information which would "im-
pede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would
prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises" is ex-
empt from disclosure. Id. art. XVII:4(d).
242. See UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XVII, supra note 231, para. 1.
243. State trading enterprises which import goods solely for governmental
use or in use by the state trading enterprise and not otherwise for resale or use
in the production of goods for sale are exempted from the notification require-
ment. See id.
244. Id. para. 1. WTO Members are instructed to use a form adopted in
1960. See GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) 184-185.
245. See UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XVII, supra note 231, para. 3.
246. Id. para. 2.
247. See id. para. 4.
248. Id. para. 5. Membership on the working party is open to all Members.
249. See id. The working party is instructed to develop an illustrative list
showing the kinds of relationships between governments and enterprises, and
the kinds of activities, engaged in by these enterprises, which may be relevant
for the purposes of Article XVII.'
250. See id. The WTO Secretariat has prepared a background paper on
state trading for the working party. See WTO, OPERATIONS OF STATE TRADING
ENTERPRISES As THEY RELATE TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE (G/STR/2)(Oct. 26,
1995).
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The role of state trading enterprises in international agri-
cultural trade was discussed during the Uruguay Round of agri-
cultural negotiations, but there was no consensus on requiring
any major new disciplines on their activities.25' The Agree-
ment's prohibition on non-tariff barriers applies to such meas-
ures maintained by state trading enterprises. 25 2 In addition, the
WTO Committee on Agriculture has required information about
the activities of state trading enterprises which are used to ad-
minister market access commitments. 253 However, an attempt
to get a price transparency provision into the export subsidies
provisions failed to reach a concensus. 25 4
The principal concerns regarding state trading enterprises
with import monopolies are that they could be used to provide
protection for domestic producers by setting resale prices of im-
ports at high levels, thereby impairing or nullifying expected
benefits of tariff concessions. 255 Single desk buyers are able to
charge mark-ups to capture quota rents or reduce the demand
for the imported products. 25 6 These entities provide insufficient
transparency regarding import pricing, resale pricing, grade and
quality of supply and demand, and availability of supply,25 7
thereby interfering with the communication between manufac-
turers and ultimate buyers. Single desk buyers also could dis-
guise import restrictions and effect the type, grade and quality
of imports.258
Tariffication of all non-tariff border measures and the bind-
ing of all agricultural tariffs should reduce the role of state trad-
ing enterprises in light of the GATT rule on import mark-ups on
products subject to tariff bindings. However, state trading enter-
251. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES: COM-
PLIANCE WITH THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 14 (Aug. 30,
1995) [hereinafter GAO].
252. See AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE, supra note 26, art. 4.2, n.1.
253. See GAO, supra note 253, at 15.
254. See MERLINDA INGCO & FRANCIS NG, DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS OF STATE
TRADING IN AGRICULTURE: ISSUES FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 7 (World Bank, Feb. 1998).
255. See id. at 5; Karen Ackerman, State Trading Enterprises in World Agri-
cultural Trade, AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO 43 (Dec. 1998).
256. See id. Japan negotiated maximum markups on imports of rice and
wheat by the Food Agency. See Ackerman, supra note 227, at 32-33.
257. See, eg., PRAVEEN DIXrT & TIM JOSLING, STATE TRADING IN AGRICUL-
TURE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEwoRK, International Agricultural Trade Research
Consortium Working Paper 9-12 (July 1997).
258. See id; see also Ackerman, supra note 227, at 33-36; JUNG-SUP CHOI,
DANIEL A. SUMNER AND Joo Ho SONG, IMPORTING STES IN KOREA AND JAPAN:
EVOLUTION, OPERATION , AND IMPLICATIONS 5 (Nov. 19, 1998).
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prises which have exclusive import rights under tariff quotas
have a very good record of fill rates compared to other types of
administration of tariff quotas.259 Of 21 tariff quotas adminis-
tered by state trading enterprises in WTO Members, 81 percent
were 80 to 100 percent filled in 1996.260 By contrast, the per-
centages of comparable fill rates by other administration meth-
ods were 33.3 percent for auctioning, 38 percent for automatic
licensing, 50.6 percent for first-come/first-served, and 62.7 per-
cent for tariff quotas allocated pursuant to historical shares.261
This data undermines the argument for modifications to the
rules on state trading enterprises with import monopolies.
Another concern is that single desk sellers may benefit from
financial backing by the government, and the provision of subsi-
dies could enable them to export products at artificially low
prices and circumvent export subsidy disciplines. 262 Such enti-
ties may be able to practice price discrimination and price pool-
ing more easily than private competitors, and the lack of price
transparency makes it difficult to determine if there has been
compliance with commitments on export subsidies. 263 Both
Australia and New Zealand have disputed that single desk sell-
ers have any significant advantage over private sector exporters
with respect to price transparency, price discrimination, price
pooling or negotiating long term contracts.264 This disagree-
ment between the United States and two key members of the
Cairns Group means that it is unlikely that negotiators could
"fine tune" the rules for state trading enterprises in any mean-
ingful manner, especially considering that Japan, China, Can-
ada, India, Indonesia, and several other major developing
countries would not be likely to support any substantial reforms
due to the state trading enterprises they maintain.
259. See WTO, TARFF QUOTA ADMINISTRATION METHODS AND TARIFF QUOTA
FILL 16 (Nov. 6, 1997).
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See JOSLING, supra note 79, at 7-8. See also Karen Ackerman, State
Trading Enterprises in World Agricultural Trade, Agriculture in the WTO 43,
44-45 (Dec. 1998).
263. See id.
264. See State Trading Enterprises (Single Desk Buyers and Single Desk
Sellers), Paper by Australia, WTO AIE/16:- 27 (Jan. 27, 1998); Paper Based on
New Zealand's Comments (20 January 1998) on the US paper on State Trading
Enterprises, Paper by New Zealand WTO AIE/ll (Feb. 5, 1998).
[Vol. 9:41
20001 FURTHERjNG REFORMS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 79
E. BIOTECHNOLOGY
American farmers are increasingly planting the seeds of ge-
netically modified organisms (GMO) for crop varieties that are
designed to improve productivity. 265 New GMO varieties of soy-
beans and corn are resistant to herbicides, such as Roundup or
Liberty Link, and reduce farmers need to use multiple treat-
ments.2 66 Since Roundup Ready soybeans were placed on the
market in 1996, farmers are expected to plant them on half the
total U.S. soybean acreage this year. 267 A variety of genetically
altered corn, known as Bt corn, is resistant to European corn
borers and could be planted this year on 15 to 18 million acres,
roughly 20 percent of corn acreage. 268 Farmers are also plant-
ing GMO sunflowers, canola, cotton, and other crops for resist-
ance to pests and pesticides, as well as a host of other value-
enhanced crops for improved output traits, such as varieties of
soybeans, corn and canola that produce superior oil qualities. 269
Jurisdiction over the approval of GMO products is divided
among three federal agencies.270 The Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture is responsible for protecting domestic crops from pests and
diseases and has jurisdiction over the introduction into the envi-
ronment of genetically modified organisms and products that
are plant pests or that there is reason to believe are plant
pests.271 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ensures
the safety of pesticides and regulates the distribution of plants
and microbes producing pesticidal substances. 272 The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health and
265. See Peter A. Riley, Linwood Hoffman, & Mark Ash, U.S. Farmers Are
Rapidly Adopting Biotech Crops, AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 21-22 (Aug. 1998).
266. See id. at 22.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Peter A. Riley, Linwood Hoffman, Value-Enhanced Crops: Biotechnol-
ogy's Next Stage, AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 18 (March 1999).
270. See ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, United States
Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/
OECD/usregs.htm; See also KELCH, supra note KK, at 34-35; BRUCE A. LARSON
AND MARY K. KNUDSON, Public Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology Field
Tests: Economic Implications of Alternative Approaches, American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 174-179 (Aug. 1991).
271. See the Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. § 150aa et seq.; Introduction of
Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering
Which are Plant Pests or Which There is Reason to Believe are Plant Pests, 7
C.F.R. § 340.0 et seq.
272. See the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136; Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 9; 40 C.F.R. Parts
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Human Services regulates foods and feeds derived from geneti-
cally engineered plant varieties.273 The Food and Drug Admin-
istration's policy on biotechnology is to treat substances
intentionally added to foods through genetic engineering as food
additives if they are significantly different in structure, function,
or amount from substances otherwise found in food.274 The spec-
tacular success of GMO products launched into commercial use
in the United States may be due to the public policy of treating
these new products the same as traditional products for pur-
poses of risk assessments. 275
The future of biotech crops, however, has been clouded by
foreign governmental policies inspired by fear of the unknown
and hostility toward technology.276 While the European Union
began by approving the use of Roundup Ready soybeans and Bt
corn, 277 the EU Commissioner of Agriculture later called for seg-
regation of GMO crops from non-GMO crops and for mandatory
labeling at all levels down to the retail level. 278 The EU ulti-
mately adopted mandatory laboratory testing and labeling re-
quirements for food processors.2 7 9 Japan is considering a
labeling requirement, even though Japanese consumers accept
biotech foods.280 Several other countries have also adversely re-
152, 172, & 180; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53; 40 C.F.R. Part
725.
273. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 9; Statement of
Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. (May 29, 1992).
274. See id; see also Henry I. Miller, Biotechnology and Food, JOURNAL OF
COMMERCE, Sep. 1, 1998.
275. See David R. Kelch, Mark Simone, and Mary Lisa Madell, Biotechnol-
ogy in Agriculture Confronts Agreements in the WTO, AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO
34 (Dec. 1998).
276. See CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, U.S.-European Agricultural Trade: Food
Safety and Biotechnology Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 3 (Oct. 21,
1998). This report describes the position of Greenpeace, shared by consumer
groups, that the long term effects of GMOs are unknown and therefore labeling
is warranted. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHITE PAPER ON GROWTH, COM-
PETITIVENESS, AND EMPLOYMENT, COM(93) 700 Final, para. 5.5-5.9 (Dec. 5,
1993); Michael Specter, Europe, Bucking Trend in U.S., Blocks Genetically Al-
tered Food, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1998.
277. See HANRAHAN, supra note 278.
278. See id. at 4; see also Glickman Repeats Threat To Use WTO on GMO
Labeling Issue in EU, REUTER, July 9, 1997.
279. See HANRAHAN, supra note 278, at 4; EU Ministers Establish Label-
ing Rule for Genetically Modified Organisms, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER,
May 27, 1998.
280. See The Government of Japan's Comments on the 1999 National Trade
Estimates (NTE) Report, para. 3(1) (April 16, 1999) < httpJ/www.infojapan.org/
region/n-americalus/economy/date/416/index.html.>; Thomas J. Hoban, How
Japanese Consumers View Biotechnology, FOOD TECHNOLOGY (July, 1996).
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acted to the biotechnology revolution.281 In the United States, a
proposed rule by the Department of Agriculture on organic farm-
ing which would have allowed the use of GMOs provoked a
storm of protests. 28 2 The U.S. Trade Representative has identi-
fied biotechnology as a priority issue for the next round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations. 28 3
Both the Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the "SPS Agreement")284
and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the "TBT
Agreement")285 apply to labeling requirements for imports of ag-
ricultural goods as well as industrial goods. 28 6 The SPS Agree-
ment applies to "sanitary and phytosanitary measures" which
affect international trade.2 7 The TBT Agreement applies to
"technical regulations other than sanitary and phytosanitary
measures.
288
"Sanitary and phytosanitary measures" is defined in the
SPS Agreement and specifically includes "labeling requirements
directly related to food safety."28 9 Thus, a GMO labeling re-
quirement is covered by the SPS Agreement if it is a sanitary or
phytosanitary measure affecting international trade and it is di-
rectly related to food safety. "Technical regulations" are defined
in the TBT Agreement as a "[d]ocument which lays down prod-
uct characteristics or their related processes and production
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions,
with which compliance is mandatory"290 and includes technical
regulations which "deal exclusively with ... labelling require-
ments as they apply to a product, process or production
281. See, eg., Canberra Organic Growers Society, GE Foods to be Labelled in
Australia >; Brazil Caves in to US Transgenic Soya, Genetic Resources Action
International < http'J/www.purefood.org/News/brazil.html>.
282. See National Organic Program, Proposed Rule, 62 FR 65849 (Dec. 16,
1997); the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, as amended (7 U.S.C. § 6501
et. seq.).
283. See America's Agricultural Trade Agenda, Speech by U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Charlene Barshefsky to the National Association of Agricultural Jour-
nalists, Washington, D.C. (April 19, 1999).
284. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 1A, 69-84 [hereinaf-
ter SPS Agreement].
285. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 1A, 138-162 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
286. See Kelch et al., supra note 277.
287. See SPS Agreement, supra note 286, art. 1.1.
288. See TBT Agreement, supra note 287, art. 2.1 and 1.5.
289. See SPS Agreement, supra note 286, Annex A, para. 1.
290. See TBT Agreement, supra note 287, Annex 1, para.1.
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method."291 Accordingly, a GMO labeling requirement is covered
by the TBT Agreement if it applies to a product, process or pro-
duction method and does not consist of an SPS measure. 292
The difficult issue is determining whether a measure is a
"sanitary or phytosanitary measure" which is defined in terms of
the purpose of the measure: to protect humans or animals from
food-borne risks (arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs) or
from diseases carried by animals and plants; to protect animals
or plants from pests or diseases; or to prevent or limit other
damage from pests. 293 The underlying purpose most commonly
cited for GMO labeling requirements is the protection of
humans from risks arising from potential contaminants in
foods.294 The presence of the GMO in a commodity shipment or
the presence of the altered DNA or the residue of the GMO in
meat or a processed product could be viewed as a contami-
nant.295 In any event, the invocation of a public health concern
to justify a GMO labeling requirement would make it an SPS
measure.
291. Id.
292. The TBT Agreement clearly provides that it does not apply to sanitary
and phytosanitary measures as defined in the SPS Agreement. See TBT Agree-
ment, supra note 287, art. 1.5.
293. See SPS Agreement, Annex A, para. 1. This provision defines sanitary
or phytosanitary measure as "any measure applied: to protect animal or plant
life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from the
entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or
disease-causing organisms; to protect human or animal life or health within the
territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins
or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; to protect
human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, es-
tablishment or spread of pests; or to prevent or limit other damage within the
territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests." This
approach yields the curious result that the applicability of the SPS Agreement
depends on the purpose ascribed to it by the party defending it, with the anoma-
lous possibility that a country would choose to deny that it's purpose is to pro-
tect health. In most SPS situations, the historical record for the measure will be
replete with references to public health concerns.
294. See GREENPEACE, Genetically-Engineered Food Claims Are Hard to
Swallow (1997) <httpJ/www.greenpeace.org/-usa/campaigns/biodiversity/fact
sheet/gefacts.html>.
295. The term "contaminants" includes "pesticide and veterinary drug resi-
dues and extraneous matter" for purposes of the SPS Agreement, but this is not
an exhaustive list. See SPS Agreement, Annex A, n.4. In the EU hormone ban
controversy, the presence of residues of natural hormones in addition to those
that occurred naturally, was a contaminant. See EC Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones) - Complaint of the United States, Report of the
Panel, para. 8.22, WT/DS26/R/USA (August 18, 1997).
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The EU has cited the consumer's "right to know" or "right to
choose" as the basis for its GMO labeling requirements. 2 96 The
EU unsuccessfully argued for including such a right (referred to
as the "4 th criterion" during the negotiations) in the SPS Agree-
ment.2 97 To justify a trade restriction on the basis of consumer
concerns, the EU must explain how the consumer has an inter-
est protected by the SPS Agreement in terms of the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health or an interest protected by
the TBT Agreement as achieving some other legitimate objec-
tive. In other words, the consumer's rights to know and choose
are not a defense to a claimed violation of the SPS
Agreement. 298
The SPS Agreement provides a number of fundamental dis-
ciplines on the use of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 2 99
Each SPS measure must be based on science in that it is based
on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence and in that it is applied only to the extent
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.30 0
An SPS measure also must be based on an appropriate risk
assessment.
3 0 1
The SPS Agreement incorporates the most-favored-nation
and national treatment concepts of the GATT: WTO Members
cannot use SPS measures to arbitrarily or unjustifiably discrimi-
nate between WTO Members where identical or similar condi-
tions prevail, including between their own territory and other
Members. 30 2 This is reinforced by an exhortation to Members to
avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of pro-
tection that it finds appropriate in different circumstances. 3 0 3
In general, SPS measures should be based on international
standards, guidelines or recommendations, such as those of the
296. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, The European Commission Agrees on an
Orientation for EU Labelling of GMO Products (July 25, 1997); Kelch et. al,
supra note 277.
297. See GRETCHEN H. STANTON, Implications of the WTO Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, in UNDERSTANDING TECHNICAL BARRIERS
To AGRICULTURAL TRADE, 75
298. 298 See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 4 (July 15, 1996); Mi-
chele D. Carter, Selling Science under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating
Consumer Preference in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 625 (1997).
299. See id.
300. See SPS Agreement, supra note 286, art. 2.1.
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Codex Alimentarius Commission, where they exist,30 4 and
measures based on such international standards are immune
from challenges under the SPS Agreement. 305 SPS measures
must not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve a
WTO Member's chosen appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection,30 6 and must not constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade.30 7
The TBT Agreement establishes a number of disciplines
designed to ensure that a Member's technical regulations do not
create unnecessary obstacles to trade.308 These include the fun-
damental obligations that products imported from the territory
of any WTO Member shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin
and to like products originating in any other country,30 9 and
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.310 The national treat-
ment provision of the TBT Agreement closely parallels the
GATT.3 1 Article III has been interpreted to permit govern-
ments to distinguish between otherwise like products for legiti-
mate regulatory purposes.3 12 A panel has said that the primary
purpose of the GATT was "to lower barriers to trade between
markets, and not to harmonize the regulatory treatment of prod-
ucts within them."3 1 3
The principal mandate of the TBT Agreement requires that
"technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with
a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
304. See id. art. 3.1. International organizations, such as the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission, are beginning to examine the health implications of
GMOs but have yet to adopt standards.
305. See id. art. 3.2.
306. See id. art. 5.6.
307. See id. art. 2.3.
308. See TBT Agreement, supra note 287, art. 2.2.
309. See id. art. 2.1.
310. See id. art. 2.2.
311. See GAIT, supra note 15, art. III:4.
312. See United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
Report of the Panel, GATT B.I.S.D. (39' Supp.) at 206 (June 19, 1992). The
panel explained: "The purpose of Article III is ... not to prevent contracting
parties from using their fiscal and regulatory powers for purposes other than to
afford protection to domestic production ..... " Id. Consequently, in determin-
ing whether two products subject to different treatment are like products, it is
necessary to consider whether such product differentiation is being made "so as
to afford protection to domestic production." Id.
313. United States - Taxes on Automobiles, Report of the Panel, para. 5.8
(DS31/R).
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international trade."314 Technical regulations must not be more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective,
including national security requirements, the prevention of de-
ceptive practices, and the protection of human health or safety,
animal or plant life or health, or the environment.3 15 In assess-
ing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia:
available scientific and technical information, related processing
technology or intended end-uses of products.
It is clear that either the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agree-
ment applies to the regulation of GMOs, depending on the pur-
pose of the regulation. Neither agreement permits a policy of
banning trade in GMO products while awaiting scientific evi-
dence. Negotiators in the next round of multilateral trade nego-
tiations may undertake to clarify rules for the regulation of
GMOs or may defer to activities already underway in the Con-
vention on Biodiversity or the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development. Any redrafting of the Uruguay Round
agreements to accommodate GMOs is likely to be in the nature
of fine-tuning rather than a major revision.
V. CONCLUSION
The central issues to be addressed in the upcoming agricul-
tural talks are questions of how far and how fast: the rates of
reductions of subsidies and tariffs and the lengths of transition
periods. To a large extent, the next round will be the Uruguay
Round, Part II. If the texts of the Agreement on Agriculture and
the SPS Agreement remain substantially intact, the negotiation
could be completed in three years.
The negotiations will once again pit countries with exten-
sive state intervention in agriculture-principally the European
Union and Japan supported by Switzerland, Norway and Korea
and some developing countries-against the advocates of reform
and liberalization among countries with substantially less inter-
vention in agriculture-principally the Cairns Group and the
United States, supported by developing countries with strong
export interests. The expiration of the peace clause gives lever-
age to the reform camp to extract major concessions in return for
a further extension. On the other hand, the inability of the Con-
gress to reassemble the old bipartisan coalition in favor of trade
liberalization to enact a fast track bill could hamstring the re-
314. TBT Agreement, supra note 287, art. 2.2.
315. See id.
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form movement by sharply reducing U.S. negotiating leverage.
And the failure of the European Union's Agenda 2000 to produce
substantial reductions in domestic support under the Common
Agricultural Policy will limit the EU negotiators' flexibility.
